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Abstract
We study liquidity on the London Stock Exchange. We find that the average
bid-ask spread declines, but that the skewness of the spread increases. These
results are robust to firm size, trading volume and price level. Our findings
hold when the bid-ask spread is estimated utilising high frequency data. We
find that the bid-ask spread prior to earnings announcements dates is sig-
nificantly higher than that of post earnings announcements, suggesting that
asymmetric information has driven the increase in liquidity skewness. We
also find that the effect of earnings announcements is more pronounced in the
2007 global financial crisis, consistent with the notion that extreme market
downturns amplify asymmetric information. Our overall evidence also im-
plies that increased competition and transparent trading environments limit
market makers’ abilities to cross-subsidize bid-ask spreads between periods of
high and low levels of asymmetric information.
Keywords: Asymmetric information; Bid-ask spread; Liquidity; London Stock
Exchange; Skewness
JEL Classification: G01; G12; G14
1 Introduction
Liquidity is a central feature of securities and financial markets. Liquid financial
markets allow market participants to trade large amounts of securities without price
impact and at a low cost. Amihud and Mendelson (1986) and Amihud (2002) find
that liquidity affects the expected return of assets. Practically, liquidity plays an
important role in high frequency trading, which expanded vastly in the last decade
(O’Hara, 2014). As high frequency trading is more sensitive to transaction costs,
traders tend to demand more liquid assets (Bowen, Hutchinson, and O’Sullivan,
2010). Also, central banks, financial regulators and policy makers are concerned with
market liquidity and its dynamics over time given its importance in the promotion
of financial stability (Pelizzon et al. 2016).
In recent decades stock market liquidity has significantly increased. The im-
provement is largely due to the adoption of new computing and communication
technologies. However, it is also due arguably to increased competition between
multilateral trading facilities and exchanges, transparent pre-trade and post-trade
information, the reduction in minimum tick size, and the clamp down on market
abuse and insider trading.
Liquidity can be measured by the cost of immediate execution: the bid-ask
spread. Traders can submit limit orders awaiting execution or pay the bid-ask
spread premium to execute market orders immediately. The quoted ask price reflects
a premium required for immediate buying and the bid price contains a concession
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for immediate selling. Hence, the skewness of bid-ask spreads and its variation over
time helps us gain insights into the pattern of trading costs. Using the bid-ask spread
as a proxy for liquidity, the aim of this paper is to investigate the distribution and
dynamics of liquidity.
Early work on the dynamics of liquidity suggests that changes in liquidity skew-
ness can be attributed to increased competition between market markers. Glosten
and Milgrom (1985) argue that the specialist with monopoly power can set the bid-
ask spread more flexibly than those faced with a more competitive environment.
Consistent with Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Roll and Subrahmanyam (2010) fur-
ther contend that the skewness of bid-ask spreads is driven by competition among
market makers who are less able to cross-subsidize bid-ask spreads during periods of
high and low levels of asymmetric information. In periods of low level of asymmet-
ric information market makers with monopoly power are more able to raise spreads
and to cover increased losses to informed agents than during periods of high level of
asymmetric information. The decline in cross subsidisation in a competitive market
contrasts with that of a ‘monopolistic’ regime in which market makers can flexibly
set bid-ask spreads. Increased market competitiveness should force market makers
to break even on each transaction across periods of high and low levels of asymmetric
information. Consistent with this notion, Bessembinder (2003) show that increased
competition and low tick size lead to a clustering of small spreads. However, the
bid-ask spread can be positively skewed when the market is illiquid and information
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asymmetry is high (Pelizzon et al. 2016). Roll and Subrahmanyam (2010) find
that bid-ask spreads in the U.S. equity market have declined, with the spreads also
becoming increasingly right-skewed during the period of 1993-2007. Roll and Sub-
rahmanyam (2010) attribute liquidity skewness to asymmetric information. Their
findings show that liquidity skewness is positively correlated with asymmetric in-
formation between firms and investors proxied by institutional holdings and analyst
following.
This paper investigates liquidity skewness in the London Stock Exchange (LSE).
The LSE is the third largest stock market in the world and its institutional setting
is different from the U.S. markets. Our study is the first out-of-sample test of the
findings of Roll and Subrahmanyam (2010). Our dataset includes both daily bid-
ask spreads and high frequency spreads in the LSE from September 1997 to March
2009. Our paper is distinguished from previous studies in two aspects. First, our
sample period covers the two biggest market declines in recent times, namely the
collapse of the dot-com bubble (2000-2002) and the start of the global financial
crisis (2007-2008). Prior studies show that extreme market downturns significantly
reduce liquidity in assets such as government bonds and stocks (Pelizzon et al.
2016; Hameed et al. 2010; Brummermeier and Pedersen, 2009). These studies would
suggest that liquidity should exhibit different patterns over our sample period. Also,
extreme market downturns affect investors’ funding capital and, therefore, are likely
to widen bid-ask spreads compared to normal times (Brummermeier and Pedersen,
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2009). This notion implies that the bid-ask spread is likely to be right-skewed in
periods of crisis. Second, the LSE is subject to EU legislation. Specifically, the LSE
adopted the Market in Financial Instrument Directive (MiFID) in November 2007.
MiFID has significantly changed European equity markets, it has increased market
competition and transparency. Market makers are required to disclose bid and ask
prices, volume and the depth of trading to the general public before and after each
transaction in a timely manner. Our sample period covers the adoption of MiFID
and consequently allows us to consider the initial impact of MiFID on the LSE.
Our results show that average bid-ask spreads in the LSE decrease significantly
throughout our sample period, suggesting a substantial decline in trading costs
in the LSE. The bid-ask spread reaches its lowest level between 2008 and 2009,
consistent with the anticipated impact of MiFID. However, the skewness of bid-
ask spreads has increased over our sample period. This evidence is consistent with
the notion that increased competition and enhanced trading environments limit the
power of market makers to flexibly set bid-ask spreads over time. Our findings
further show that the skewness of bid-ask spreads peaks when the dot-com bubble
burst (2000-2002), and at the outset of the global financial crisis (2007-2008). The
results imply that extreme market downturns have a significantly negative effect on
market liquidity, consistent with the recent findings of Pelizzon et al. (2016). We
also show that the bid-ask spread prior to earnings announcements is significantly
higher than the spread in the post earning announcements period. Our evidence
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that the bid-ask spread is high in extreme market downturns and prior to earnings
announcements is consistent with the asymmetric information based explanation for
the skewness of liquidity. Our main findings are robust to firm size, trading volume
and price level. Finally, our cross-sectional analysis confirms a positive relationship
between earnings announcements and the skewness of bid-ask spreads in the 2007
global financial crisis. This result implies that extreme market downturns amplify
asymmetric information on the LSE.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes the institutional
background of the London Stock Exchange and the data set we used in this study.
Section 3 provides the results. Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 The London Stock Exchange and the Data
2.1 The London Stock Exchange
The London Stock Exchange is one of the oldest stock exchanges in the world and
has its history back to 1698. Today, the LSE is the third largest stock trading venue
in the world with a combined market capitalization of over £1.1 trillion on its Main
Market1, just behind NASDAQ and NYSE Euronext. A wide range of securities,
including equity, fixed income, derivatives, exchange traded funds, structured prod-
ucts and covered warrants, are traded in the LSE. Stocks are traded in the Main
Market and Alternative Investment Market (AIM) of the Exchange. Derivatives are
1Statistics from http://www.londonstockexchange.com/statistics/markets/main-market/main-
market.htm.
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traded in the EDX London exchange.
There exists several electronic trading platforms in the LSE, each suited to a
specific type of security. Most liquid stocks are traded on the Stock Exchange
Electronic Trading System (SETS) which was created in October 1997. This covers
all FTSE 100 companies, FTSE 100 Reserves and most liquid FTSE 250 companies.
In SETS the average daily number of trades in 2008 was 763,286, and the average
daily value traded was £8.1 billion2. Our empirical research concentrates on SETS.
SETS, as an electronic limit order book trading platform, allows market participants
to submit orders to buy or sell stocks and to execute against existing orders. Market
participants can observe each stock’s trading statistics, including recent transaction
prices and the state of the order book, through electronic screens. The SETS trading
day is split into three periods3: an opening auction period, a continuous trading
period and a closing auction period. The opening auction starts at 7:50 and ends at
8:00. The closing auction starts at 16:30 and ends at 16:35. A number of different
types of orders can be submitted to the SETS order book.4
2Calculated according to statistics from http://www.londonstockexchange.com/statistics
/historic/secondary-markets/secondary-markets.htm.
3The LSE introduced an intra-day auction in March 2016.
4In this study, the dataset covers the period from 1997 to 2009, the type of orders traded during
this period include market orders, limit orders, iceberg orders, at best orders, execute or eliminate
orders, and fill or kill orders. In recent years, the type of orders has changed due to a significant im-
provement in latency. For the latest type of orders, see http://www.lseg.com/areas-expertise/our-
markets/london-stock-exchange/equities-markets/trading-services/domestic-trading-services/sets.
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2.2 The Data
The daily data was obtained from Datastream and includes daily bid-ask spreads
between September 1996 and March 2009. This sample period covers the the dot-
com bubble (2000-2002) and the start of the global financial crisis (2007-2008). Our
sample stocks are traded in SETS. We exclude investment trust companies. We use
both quoted bid-ask spreads and proportional bid-ask spreads. The latter measures
trading costs on a relative basis which is the difference between the ask and bid
prices divided by the mid-point of the two prices.
We also examine bid-ask spreads using high frequency data from the LSE for the
period 1997 to 2009. The high frequency data consists of the ‘tick and best price’
data and the ‘historical order book rebuild’ data. We use the following criteria to
eliminate high frequency noise from individual stocks: (1) the stock price must not
be lower than 10p and not higher than £999.99; (2) each stock must last 48 months
over our data period (September 1996 to March 2009) with valid quotations within
market opening hours; (3) the price of a stock in the LSE database must have a
corresponding price record on Datastream. After the implementation of the above
rules, the data set extended to 1,600 stocks and more than 528 million trades.
For selected stocks, we exclude trades or quotes that are booked during opening
and closing auction periods, and that are out of sequence. To determine the direction
of trades, the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm is applied to match the trading data
with the best preceding quote within 5 seconds. In the Lee and Ready algorithm,
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a buy order is classified when its transaction price is above the midquote; while a
sell order is when the transaction price is below the midquote. The ‘tick test’ is
applied to those trades where the transaction price falls at the midpoint between
the bid and ask quote. A trade is classified as a buy order if the strike price is
higher than the previous trade price. While a trade is classified as a sell order if
the price is lower than the previous transaction price. Anomalous trades are also
omitted. We consider the following trades to be anomalies: (1) trades with negative
bid-ask spreads; (2) proportional quoted spreads >20%; (3) quoted spreads >£5.00.
Following the procedure in Hameed et al. (2010), we calculate the proportional
quoted spread (QSPR) by dividing the difference between ask and bid quotes by
their midquote. Daily QSPRs are then aggregated by averaging spreads for each day.
Finally, our earnings announcement data is obtained from Thomson One Banker.
3 Empirical Results
3.1 Summary Statistics
Table 1 reports our preliminary results. Panel A and B provide mean, standard
deviation and skewness for proportional spreads and quoted spreads. The statistics
are reported on a year-by-year basis. For example, the statistics for 1997 are calcu-
lated from September 2006 to August 1997. The same rule is applied in other years
with the exception of 2009 which covers the period from September 2008 to March
2009.
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Panel A shows that the mean of proportional quoted spreads increases sub-
stantially between 1996 and 2003 and then slowly decreases in the following years.
Between 2002 and 2003, the average of proportional spreads has larger values than
other years, suggesting that the collapse of the dot-com bubble had an adverse
impact on liquidity. However, the skewness of proportional quoted spreads has sig-
nificantly increased over the sample period. The last row in Panel A shows that
the skewness of proportional quoted spreads is significantly different between 1997
and 2009. The skewness of the spreads in 2002 and 2003 is higher than in preceding
years, implying that the bursting of the dot-com bubble caused the bid-ask spread
to become positively skewed. Interestingly, a similar effect repeats in 2008 when the
skewness of proportional bid-ask spreads reaches a peak (1.16). We also plot the
skewness of proportional quoted spreads in Fig 1. The graph depicts a pattern of
upward drift over time. Two of the spikes in spread skewness coincides respectively
with the collapse of the dot-come bubble around 2001 and the global financial crisis
in 2008.
In Panel B, the average of quoted spreads has the largest values in 2000 and 2001
and sharply declines in the following years. The substantial decline in the quoted
bid-ask spreads since 2000 indicates a reduction in trading costs and an improve-
ment in liquidity on the LSE. The improved trading transparency may contribute
to changes in liquidity. Consistent with this conjecture, in the period 2008 to 2009,
the quoted spreads have reached historical low levels. The evidence suggests that
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MiFID implemented in 2007 has improved market quality on the LSE. Similar to
Panel A, we find that the skewness of quoted spreads has dramatically increased
over the sample period. Once again, the skewness reaches the highest level in 2008
at 1.1263, consistent with extreme negative market conditions being responsible for
the skewness of bid-ask spreads. Our evidence of increasing skewness of bid-ask
spreads also suggests that market makers become less able to influence bid and ask
prices over time in line with regulatory initiatives to promote a fair and transparent
trading environment.
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Table 1: Statistics of Annual Proportional Quoted Spread and Quoted
Spreads
This table depicts summary statistics for the annual proportional quoted
spreads and the raw annual quoted spreads for all stocks listed on the LSE.
Statistics are calculated for each stock for each year ending at the 31st August.
Daily bid-ask spreads for each stock are obtained from Datastream. The indi-
vidual statistics are averaged on an equally-weighted basis to form the results
presented in this table.
Year Mean Std Skewness Number of firms
Panel A: Statistics for proportional quoted spreads
1997a 0.0391 0.0144 0.1503 2409
1998 0.0408 0.0165 0.4414 2499
1999 0.0453 0.0195 0.3677 2428
2000 0.0451 0.0197 0.3419 2468
2001 0.0483 0.0222 0.4051 2483
2002 0.0521 0.0266 0.6121 2398
2003 0.0530 0.0279 0.6858 2201
2004 0.0484 0.0217 0.4350 2273
2005 0.0473 0.0225 0.6411 2538
2006 0.0458 0.0239 0.7934 2712
2007 0.0443 0.0231 0.7813 2732
2008 0.0450 0.0247 1.1648 2587
2009b 0.0494 0.0337 1.0464 2228
H0 2009−1997 0.0103 0.0193 0.8961
t− statistics (10.1202) (31.5858) (19.9259)
*** *** ***
Panel B: Statistics for quoted spreads
1997 7.3267 2.5240 -0.1137 2409
1998 7.7961 3.0091 0.1369 2499
1999 7.4884 2.7794 0.0676 2428
2000 10.4031 5.4856 0.0778 2468
2001 9.5400 4.8923 0.2207 2483
2002 7.2040 3.6280 0.3708 2398
2003 5.9413 2.6651 0.5930 2201
2004 6.4784 2.8401 0.2786 2273
2005 6.1564 2.9987 0.5319 2538
2006 5.9351 3.1623 0.7020 2712
2007 5.8649 3.2228 0.7068 2732
2008 4.9568 2.4989 1.1263 2587
2009 4.1696 2.4023 1.0157 2228
H0 2009−1997 -3.1571 -0.1217 1.1294
t− statistics (-5.3897) (-0.4070) (21.8812)
0.9999 0.6580 *** ***:p<0.01
a The data set commences from September 1996. The first row records statis-
tics for September 1996 to August 1997 and the following rows comply with
the same rule.
b The data set ends in March 2009 and the last row covers the period from
September 2008 to March 2009.
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Figure 1: The annual proportional quoted spread skewness.
The skewness for proportional quoted spreads is calculated for all stocks listed in the LSE.
The skewness is calculated for each stock for each year ended on 31st August from the
corresponding daily data in Datastream, with the annual skewness calculated as the equally-
weighted average skewness over all stocks.
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3.2 Liquidity Skewness by Market Capitalisation, Volume,
and Price
Small-cap companies are usually characterized by small market capitalization, low
trading volume and low prices. They are additionally more prone to liquidity risk,
therefore, they have wider bid-ask spreads. To better understand the dynamics of
the skewness of spreads, we examine the skewness of the proportional quoted spread
across market capitalisation, trading volume, and price level. We rank firms by their
market capitalisation, trading volume, and price level respectively; then for each we
calculate the skewness of proportional quoted spreads. This information is presented
by quartile in Table 2.
Panel A reports the skewness of proportional quoted spreads conditional upon
firm size. In the lowest size quartile, the skewness steadily increases from 2000 to
2003. Subsequently, it drops in 2004 and then increases again with a peak in 2009.
In the second size quartile, we find that the overall trend is that of a modest increase
in skewness. A similar pattern appears in the third size quartile. In the highest size
quartile, the results show that skewness spikes in 2000 and 2008. This evidence
is consistent with extreme market downturns driving the positive skewness of bid-
ask spreads. In addition, the magnitude of skewness is greatest in the highest size
quartile. The mean tests at the bottom of Panel A indicate that the skewness of
bid-ask spreads significantly increases over time and across size quartiles.
In Panel B and C, we report the skewness of bid-ask spread conditioning upon
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trading volume and price level, respectively. The results show that the skewness
across trading volume and price levels exhibits similar patterns to those in Panel
A. More specifically, heavily traded and high-priced stocks have more right-skewed
spreads than their counterparts. In general, there is a significant increase in the
skewness from the first to the last sample years. In addition, large, frequently traded
and high priced stocks all have the largest skewness in 2008 (i.e. 3.36, 3.02 and 2.42
in Panel A, B and C, respectively), suggesting that the 2007 global financial crisis
drives the skewness of liquidity. In sum, we find that increased skewness of bid-ask
spreads is neither a small-cap phenomenon nor a phenomenon of thinly-traded and
low-priced stocks.
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Table 2: Skewness of proportional spreads by market
capitalisation, market volume, and price level
The skewness of proportional spreads by categories. Panel A
is the liquidity skewness by market capitalisation. Panel B
depicts the liquidity skewness by volume and Panel C shows
the liquidity skewness by the market price for each year which
is calculated from the beginning of the previous September
until the end of the current August for each year. The skew-
ness is calculated for individual stocks during each year, then
we calculate the equally-weighted average for that year.
Year Size quartile
Smallest 2nd 3rd Largest
Panel A: Liquidity skewness by market capitalisation
1997 0.0555 -0.0110 0.1153 0.2658
1998 0.0500 0.0600 0.1621 1.2912
1999 0.2550 0.1632 0.2351 0.9778
2000 -0.1424 0.0782 0.1901 1.5988
2001 0.2348 0.0698 0.2614 1.2658
2002 0.5718 0.2432 0.3102 1.3455
2003 1.1214 0.1399 0.1348 1.2899
2004 0.4649 0.0076 0.1170 1.2878
2005 0.5669 -0.0037 0.4228 2.0521
2006 0.8573 0.0775 0.8294 2.0174
2007 0.5731 0.1456 0.8100 1.9921
2008 0.7238 0.2877 0.5924 3.3651
2009 1.5195 0.2769 0.3978 2.0727
2009-1997 1.4641 0.2878 0.2825 1.8069
(t− statistics) 10.0863 9.8400 9.0198 12.2256
p− value (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
df 416 475 483 489
continue. . .
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Table 2: Continued
Year Volume quartile
Smallest 2nd 3rd Largest
Panel B: Liquidity skewness by market volume
1997 0.1772 0.1786 0.2971 0.3750
1998 0.3318 0.2528 0.4335 2.0342
1999 0.1612 0.3272 0.3406 1.3394
2000 -0.1794 0.1881 0.2683 1.7914
2001 0.3729 0.2495 0.3364 1.4334
2002 0.4681 0.3852 0.4685 1.6039
2003 0.5210 0.3368 0.5283 1.3120
2004 0.3950 0.0598 0.2639 1.1527
2005 0.3159 0.2852 0.6734 1.6897
2006 0.4033 0.5698 1.1003 1.6373
2007 0.2182 0.3907 1.0485 1.8208
2008 0.4271 0.4433 0.8604 3.0239
2009 0.7976 0.6092 0.7878 1.9287
2009-1997 0.6204 0.4306 0.4907 1.5538
(t− statistics) 10.0754 13.3123 10.5453 15.4481
(p-value) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
df 379 431 429 458
Price quartile
Panel C: Liquidity skewness by price level
1997 0.3877 0.1278 0.0763 0.0789
1998 0.6605 0.0962 0.1751 0.9495
1999 0.3844 0.2276 0.2376 0.7157
2000 0.0758 0.0708 0.3861 1.0381
2001 0.2738 0.1439 0.3973 0.8748
2002 0.6062 0.4000 0.4320 1.0807
2003 1.0968 0.4407 0.4446 0.9356
2004 0.4361 0.2164 0.3405 0.9066
2005 0.6444 0.3296 0.6515 1.3354
2006 0.9506 0.3798 0.8543 1.4506
2007 0.7251 0.3364 0.7243 1.5210
2008 0.9201 0.3698 0.8605 2.4245
2009 1.5167 0.5776 0.6209 1.6234
2009-1997 1.1290 0.4498 0.5446 1.5445
(t− statistics) 4.9478 9.0321 11.3178 12.4618
(p-value) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
df 480 600 566 567
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3.3 Liquidity Skewness in High-Frequency Database
We now examine the skewness of quoted spreads and proportional quoted spreads
using high frequency data from September 1996 to March 2009. To calculate the
average skewness on an annual basis, we first average spreads within a day to obtain
spreads for each stock. Second, we compute the skewness of daily spread for every
stock in each year. Finally, we calculate the average of the skewness for all sample
stocks on an annual basis. Table 3 and Figure 2 report and plot the average skewness
of quoted and proportional quoted spreads, respectively.
Table 3 shows that the skewness of quoted and proportional spreads have both
increased over time. The last row also shows that the skewness is significantly
different between 1997 and 2009. For proportional spreads, the skewness in 2002
and 2008 is 0.72 and 1.16, respectively, implying that the decline in the market
during these periods significantly constrained the ability of market makers to provide
liquidity. Figure 2 shows that the two spreads share a very similar pattern of upward
drifts over time. In addition, two spikes appear in 2002 and 2008, consistent with the
previous findings based on daily data. In general the finding of increased skewness
of bid-ask spreads is consistent for both daily data and high frequency data.
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Table 3: Skewness on the London Stock Exchange in
High Frequency Data
This table shows the London Stock Exchange intraday skew-
ness for each year. The quoted spreads are linked to corre-
sponding transactions in the tick-by-tick database for each
stocks after deleting errors where negative quotes, negative
spreads, or unreasonable quotes are presented. The spread
skewness is then computed for daily spreads for the available
stocks in each year. The annual skewness is calculated as the
equally-weighted average of each stock’s skewness in the same
year.
Year Skewness for Skewness for
Quoted spread Proportional quoted
spread
1997 -0.1137 0.1222
1998 0.1369 0.3755
1999 0.0676 0.3924
2000 0.0779 0.4503
2001 0.2207 0.4957
2002 0.3708 0.7189
2003 0.5930 0.5341
2004 0.2788 0.3907
2005 0.5321 0.6064
2006 0.7016 0.7828
2007 0.7057 0.8134
2008 1.1263 1.1637
2009 1.0167 0.7144
H02009−1997 1.0204 0.5922
(p-value) (<0.001) (<0.001)
3.4 Asymmetric Information and Earnings Announcement
Effect
In this section and the ensuing analysis we utilise the daily dataset. We also focus
on proportional quoted spreads rather than quoted spreads as the former are more
economically meaningful and free from the measurement unit.
We test whether extreme spreads are more likely to be observed during periods
of high level of asymmetric information. Glosten and Milgrom (1985) argue that in
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Figure 2: The annual quoted and proportional spread skewness calculated from the
tick-by-tick data.
a period of high level of asymmetric information, informed traders make profits from
market makers, and market makers who have monopoly power make up the loss by
setting a higher bid-ask spread in periods of low level of asymmetric information.
In circumstances of heightened competition, market makers lose monopoly power
and a minimum guaranteed profit per transaction by way of a larger spread. The
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market maker will also lose the ability to cross-subsidize spreads in periods of high
level of asymmetric information by charging higher spreads in periods of low level
of asymmetric information. The loss of the ability to cross-subsidize should result
in more extreme observations in the right-tail of the distribution of spreads.
Following Roll and Subrahmanyam (2010), we use earnings announcement dates
to identify high and low levels of asymmetric information. More specifically, the
five days prior to the earnings announcement dates are defined as the period of high
level of asymmetric information, while non-announcement dates and the five days
following the earnings announcements dates are defined as the period of low level of
asymmetric information. We use the average spread over five trading days prior to
earnings announcement dates minus the average spread in non-announcement dates
in each year, denoted as IE. We also calculate differences in the spreads for the five
days prior to and the five days following earnings announcement dates, denoted as
IE2. Table 4 reports the results.
Panel A shows that the mean difference in spreads for the five days prior to the
earnings announcement dates and non-announcement dates is negative across each
year. We also calculate changes in skewness between two periods i.e. 2005-2009 and
1999-2004 at the bottom of Panel A.5 The results show that such change is statisti-
cally significant at a reasonable confidence level. This supports the contention that
5Our earnings announcement data commences from 1999. The sample is split 1999-2004 and
2005-2009. During the first period the dot-com bubble collapsed (2000-2002), and during the
second period the onset of the global financial crisis occurred (2007-2008). Unreported analysis
finds that the results are similar when the sample is divided 1999 -2003 and 2004-2009. This also
holds for the analysis detailed in Table 5.
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asymmetric information is responsible for the increased skewness of bid-ask spreads.
In Panel B, we compare the 5-day average spread prior to and following earnings
announcements. The results show that the difference in spreads is higher in the pre-
earnings announcement period than in the post earnings announcement period with
differences reaching the highest levels in 2007 and 2008. This evidence suggests that
extreme market downturns increase the level of asymmetric information. This may
be because market makers may have encountered funding constraints during the
2007-2008 crisis given that their ability to provide additional liquidity to the mar-
ket was largely limited (Brummermeier and Pedersen, 2009). Overall, our findings
imply that asymmetric information may be responsible for the increased skewness
of bid-ask spreads.
3.5 Down market effects
Chordia et al. (2001), Hameed et al. (2001) and Hsieh et al. (2013) find that liq-
uidity declines during a pronounced market downturn. Vayanos (2004) argue that
the reduced liquidity can be attributable to market makers holding insufficient col-
lateral. Brummermeier and Pedersen (2009) contend that funding constraints faced
by market makers, sudden price drops, and illiquidity in the market can interplay
with each other to cause a liquidity spiral. In market downturns, investors face a
greater liquidity risk and they cannot sell assets unless they are willing to pay large
transaction costs. Thus, shifts in liquidity in extreme market downturns can be
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Table 4: The earnings announcement effects
Panel A is the percentage difference in spreads five days before
earnings announcement dates and the other days of the year.
Year Mean Median
Panel A: The percentage difference between spreads just before
earning announcement and other days.
1999 -1.9219 -1.9373
2000 -1.8128 -1.8357
2001 -1.7573 -1.7985
2002 -1.7444 -1.8160
2003 -1.8406 -1.8995
2004 -1.7993 -1.8380
2005 -1.7994 -1.8319
2006 -1.7751 -1.8143
2007 -1.7832 -1.8136
2008 -1.8048 -1.8276
2009 -1.8256 -1.8451
∆IE1999−2009 9.7153−2 9.2171−2
t− statistics (8.5027) (0.1932)
(p-value) (<0.0001) (0.4246)
∆IE(2005∼2009)−(1999∼2004) 6.6198−2
∆skewness(2005∼2009)−(1999∼2004) -4.2973
Cross− sectionalcorrelationIE−skewness 0.1322
(p-value) (0.0600)
Panel B: The percentage difference in spreads five days before and
five days after earnings announcement dates
1999 −1.5192
−1 −1.7789−1
2000 7.8153
−2 4.3795−3
2001 −5.2006
−3 2.2500−16
2002 1.5895
−2 3.5354−2
2003 1.3499
−2 −1.4489−2
2004 2.5485
−3 1.6998−4
2005 3.4924
−2 3.4602−2
2006 1.2482
−1 7.4241−2
2007 1.6461
−1 1.1765−1
2008 1.4990
−1 1.2129−1
2009 2.88498
−2 0
2009-1999 1.8077
−1 1.7789−1
t− statistics 1.9593 4
(p-value) (0.0333) (0.0006)
∆IE22005∼2009−1999∼2004 0.2304
∆skewness2005∼2009−1999∼2004 -4.2973
Cross-sectional correlationIE2−skewness 0.0543
(p-value) (0.4413)
Subscript s means that the index of scientific notation is to
be multiplied by 10s, for example, 2.2500
−3 is 0.00225.
responsible for the skewness of bid-ask spreads.
We now analyse the impact of market downturns on the skewness of bid-ask
spreads. Specifically, we define trading days within the fifth percentile of returns
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on the FTSE100 index as extreme market downturns. We calculate differences in
spreads between trading days within the fifth percentile and other trading days
above the sixth percentile, denoted as ER. We expect that ER will have an upward
trend over time. The results are reported in Table 5.
The results show that the mean ER is between 1.5% and 22.34%. The highest
ER appears in 2002 when the dot-com bubble burst. Furthermore, the second
highest ER occurs in 2008 at the onset of the global financial crisis. These results
are consistent with our prior that extreme market downturns significantly increase
bid-ask spreads. However, the change in ER between 1997 and 2009 is highly
significant, consistent with bid-ask spreads declining. We also show that ER and
the skewness have significantly increased from the first sub-period (1997-2003) to the
second sub-period (2004-2009). We further show that the correlation between ER
and the skewness of the bid-ask spread is also statistically significant. Collectively,
our findings suggest that extreme down markets are likely to increase bid-ask spreads
and their skewness.
3.6 Cross-Sectional Determinants
So far, we find that asymmetric information can explain the skewness of bid-ask
spreads over time. In this section, we undertake a cross-sectional analysis to in-
vestigate whether asymmetric information, proxied by firm characteristics, can also
explain the skewness. Specifically, we run cross-sectional regressions with the skew-
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Table 5: The down-market effect
The percentage difference between spreads in a down market and other market days. The down
market is defined as the situation where the market return is less than the 5th percentile of the
daily return.
Year Mean Median
1997 0.0150 0.0010
1998 0.0582 0.0456
1999 0.0793 0.0576
2000 0.1466 0.0949
2001 0.1948 0.1401
2002 0.2234 0.1594
2003 0.1702 0.1381
2004 0.1030 0.0891
2005 0.0999 0.0818
2006 0.1239 0.1064
2007 0.1362 0.1179
2008 0.1871 0.1606
2009 0.0094 0.0091
∆ER2009−1997 -0.0972 0.0922
t-statistics (8.5027) (0.1932)
(p-value) (<0.0001) (0.4246)
∆ER(2004 2009)−(1997 2003) 0.5531
∆skewness(2004 2009)−(1997 2003) 4.4210
Cross-sectional correlationER−skewness 0.0951
(p-value) <0.0001
ness of bid-ask spreads as the dependent variable. The independent variables in-
clude IE2 and ER as previously defined, firm size, return volatility as proxies for
information asymmetry. Large and less volatile stocks should have less information
opaqueness. In addition, we also include the asynchronicity measure proposed by
Hou and Moskowitz (2005) as an explanatory variable. This measure is calculated
by one minus R2 which is estimated from a regression of stock returns on the FTSE
100 index and the return on the industry portfolio that the stock belongs to. The
model is as follows
ri = αi + βirindi + σrm + ǫ, (1)
26
where ri is the return of stock i, rindi is the industry portfolio that stock i belongs
to, and rm is the market index. We use the ICB industry classification with 41
industries.
In our cross-section regressions, we also include the lagged spread because the
level of asymmetric information could correlate with the spread. To control for
endogeneity and possible “look-ahead” bias, our independent variables are lagged
by one year. Our empirical model is as follows:
SKi,t = αt + β1V olai,t−1 + β2Sizei,t−1 + β3IE2i,t−1 + β4ERi,t−1+
β5Asynchi,t−1 + β6SPREADi,t−1 + εt, (2)
where SKi,t is the skewness of the bid-ask spread of stock i at year t, V ola is the
daily volatility during the year, Size is market capitalisation at year end, IE2 is the
information asymmetry measure defined as before, ER is the measure of extreme
market downturns defined as before, Asynch is the Hou and Moskowitz (2005)
asynchronicity measure, and SPREAD is the proportional spread.
Table 6 reports descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables. The average
of daily return volatility is 0.0126 with a standard deviation of 0.0118. The average
market capitalisation is £2.41 million and the standard deviation is £10.2 million.
The mean of information asymmetry related to earnings announcements is 0.075
with a standard deviation of 0.443. The mean of information asymmetry related to
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extreme market downturns is 0.059 with a standard deviation of 0.242. The average
value of the asynchronicity measure is 0.557 and its standard deviation is 0.391.
Table 6: Summary statistics for explanatory variables.
This table summarises the descriptive statistics for cross-sectional determinants of skewness. The
determinants include the daily volatility for the year, V ola, between September 1996 and March
2009; Size is the market capitalisation for the previous year; IE2 is the percentage difference in
spreads five days after and five days before earnings announcements dates; ER is the percentage
difference of the spread between the extreme low returns and other days; Asynch is the asymmetry
measure of Hou and Moskowitz (2005), which is one minus the R2 of the regression of individual
stock returns of the same industry.
Mean Standard Deviation
V ola 1.26−2 1.18−2
Size 2.416 1.027
IE2 7.75−2 0.443
ER 5.85−2 0.2418
Asynch 0.557 0.391
The cross-sectional regression results for Equation (2) are reported in Table
7. The results show that IE2 has a significantly positive coefficient from 2005
to 2008. In addition, the coefficient peaks in 2007 and 2008. This evidence in-
dicates that information asymmetry around earnings announcements significantly
raises the skewness of liquidity during the financial crisis, consistent with our in-
formation asymmetry based argument. We also find that the lagged spread has a
marginal effect on the skewness only in 2007, suggesting that illiquid stocks prior
to the crisis are more likely to have right-skewed bid-ask spreads during the crisis.
This evidence is consistent with the liquidity spiral hypothesis (Brummermeier and
Pedersen, 2009). We also show that the coefficient on size is large and significantly
positive in 2008, implying that big firms are likely to have right-skewed bid-spreads
during the financial crisis. This evidence contrasts to our expectation that small
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firms should have positive skewness. However, it could be argued that because trad-
ing with large firms require market markers to have sufficient capital and if market
makers have funding constraints, the bid-ask spreads of large firms are more likely
to be affected than those of small firms. Overall, our evidence shows that in times
of crisis information asymmetry and the funding constraints of market makers can
explain the skewness of bid-ask spreads.
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Table 7: The cross-sectional regressions for skewness.
The summary statistics for the regression of the cross-sectional determinants of skewness.
SKi,t = αt + β1V olai,t−1 + β2Sizei,t−1 + β3IE2i,t−1 + β4ERi,t−1 + β5Asynchi,t−1 + β6SPREADi,t−1 + εt,
where the dependent variable, SKi,t, denotes the averaged skewness for the proportional quoted spreads of stock i in year t. V ola is the
daily return volatility for the year. Size is the market capitalisation at the previous year end. IE2 is the percentage difference in spreads
five days after and five days before the earnings announcement date. ER is the percentage difference of spread between the extreme low
returns and other days. Asynch is the Hou and Moskowitz (2005) information asymmetry measure. SPREAD is the average proportional
quoted spread over the year. For ease of exposition small numbers are represented in scientific subscript form, for example, 3.65−02 means
0.0365.
Year V ola Size IE2 ER Asynch SPREAD Intercept
β1 t-Stats β2 t-Stats β3 t-Stats β4 t-Stats β5 t-Stats β6 t-Stats α t-Stats
1999 -11.34 -0.56 −3.27−08 -0.55 0.85 0.38 -1.87 -0.24 1.29 0.31 -0.13 -0.42 8.06 0.60
2000 3.01 0.66 1.61−08 0.76 1.21 1.24 2.03 0.95 -2.42 -0.77 -0.06 -1.53 4.91 1.38
2001 -1.12 -0.76 7.73−10 0.09 -0.28 -0.21 0.21 0.13 0.43 0.26 -0.02 -0.71 2.65 1.71
2002 -1.21 -1.12 −1.36−08 -1.08 -0.94 -0.81 3.34 2.35 1.35 0.72 0.02 0.93 1.26 0.77
2003 -1.14 -1.30 1.13−08 0.72 -0.52 -0.74 2.17 2.69 -0.22 -0.18 -0.004 -0.19 2.23 2.14
2004 -2.14 -2.27 5.55−09 0.48 -0.33 -0.63 1.59 2.26 0.68 0.63 -0.006 -0.21 1.87 2.08
2005 -2.07 -3.42 −3.84−09 -0.33 0.93 2.20 -1.88 -2.77 -0.10 -0.10 -0.02 -0.92 2.65 3.00
2006 -1.33 -2.19 −8.80−09 -0.96 0.89 2.39 -1.32 -2.40 -0.60 -0.88 -0.0006 -0.04 2.67 4.84
2007 -0.76 -1.33 8.05−10 0.09 1.34 4.99 -0.77 -1.72 0.34 0.54 0.03 1.80 1.69 3.38
2008 -0.85 -1.11 5.15−08 3.04 1.23 2.43 -1.84 -2.36 -3.56 -3.48 -0.12 -3.04 6.66 8.12
2009 -0.20 -1.02 4.05−08 4.39 -0.05 -0.33 -0.63 -2.52 -0.26 -0.66 -0.008 -1.61 1.82 5.30
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4 Conclusion
Liquidity in financial markets is a key issue for investors, regulators and policy mak-
ers. Liquidity risk has an important role in determining transaction costs, enhancing
asset management and promoting financial stability. Measuring liquidity by bid-ask
spreads, this paper investigates the distribution and dynamics of liquidity in the
LSE from 1996 to 2009. We find that bid-ask spreads have sharply declined in our
sample period. This evidence suggests that market liquidity on the LSE has signifi-
cantly improved. We also find that the reduction in bid-ask spreads is large in 2008
and 2009, suggesting that the implementation of MiFID has improved market trans-
parency and reduced transaction costs. However, bid-ask spreads are increasingly
right-skewed. In particular, the skewness peaks in 2007 at the outset of the global
financial crisis. In that period, large firms are more likely to have right-skewed bid-
ask spreads. These results suggest that market makers may have significant funding
constraints in trading large stocks, consistent with the interaction of market liquid-
ity and funding liquidity. Our main findings are robust to firm size, trading volume
and price level and are also consistent with the results generated with high frequency
data.
Additionally, we find that bid-ask spreads are significantly higher prior to earn-
ings announcements than post earnings announcements and we suggest that this
is a consequence of asymmetric information differences. We also find that infor-
mation asymmetry is more pronounced during the global financial crisis, implying
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that market illiquidity further increases the level of asymmetric information. These
results are consistent with the view that competition reduces market makers abili-
ties to influence the bid-ask spread. Our results show that extreme down markets
are likely to increase bid-ask spreads and their skewness. Finally, our cross-section
analysis examines whether firm-specific characteristics can explain the skewness of
bid-ask spreads. We find that the effect of earnings announcements has a significant
relationship with the skewness of bid-ask spreads during the crisis period, implying
that asymmetric information is amplified by extreme market downturns
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